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Abstract
Supply chain coordination literature indicates that two-part tariff contracts cannot coordinate a supply
chain with a supplier and a retailer under information asymmetry, but can coordinate the channel under
full information, while leaving the retailer zero profit. Motivated by the practice of Costco Business
Centers, we incorporate customer heterogeneity, near-saturated retail market, and asymmetric information
into a stylized model. The retailer has the knowledge of customer heterogeneity while the supplier does
not. The supplier, on the other hand, designs a menu of two-part tariffs for the retailer to choose from. We
have found that two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information, while
leaving the retailer a positive profit. In addition, a one-size-fits-all two-part tariff can coordinate the
supply chain at equilibrium, i.e., there is no need for the supplier to design different two-part tariffs for
the retailer who may possess different types of information.
Keywords: Supply Chain Coordination, Supply Chain Management, Two-Part Tariffs, Adverse
Selection, Information Asymmetry

1. Introduction
A two-part tariff contract is a pricing scheme in which a seller charges a buyer a fixed fee and a
unit price. In general, the unit price decreases as more units are purchased, which is also known as
quantity discount. A two-part tariff with a constant unit price is called a two-part linear tariff. Unless
otherwise specified, a two-part tariff refers to a two-part linear tariff in this paper. Two-part tariffs are
commonly observed in retail markets as well as in wholesale markets. In retail markets, examples include
Costco or Sam’s Club membership, museums and zoos, and access to some website information, among
many others (Vettas, 2011). In wholesale markets, an upstream firm (hereafter denoted as the "supplier"
or "she") often charges a downstream firm (hereafter denoted as the "retailer" or "he") a lump sum for the
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right to carry her products plus a constant unit price. For example, the prevalent licensing agreement
usually specifies a fixed fee along with a royalty for each unit (San Martin and Saracho, 2015). Another
example in wholesale markets is that a credit card company charges merchants a per-transaction fee plus a
fixed fee (Reisinger, 2014).
Supply chain coordination literature indicates that a two-part tariff contract cannot coordinate a
supply chain of bilateral monopoly with a supplier and a retailer under information asymmetry (Wang et
al. 2012). While under full information, Corbett et al. (2004) demonstrated that two-part tariffs can
coordinate a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. To achieve coordination, the
manufacturer would choose a unit price equal to her marginal cost and a fixed fee equal to the total profit
that a vertically integrated monopolist would have. However, it has a rather unrealistic effect: the retailer
obtains zero profit. To overcome this unrealistic effect, Corbett et al. (2004) turned to the retailer's outside
opportunity for explanation. The outside opportunity guarantees the retailer a positive reservation profit
level.
As highlighted above, despite its popularity, a two-part tariff generally fails to coordinate supply
chain coordination under information asymmetry and results in zero profit under full information for a
retailer without external opportunity. Therefore, in this article, we ask the following questions: under
information asymmetry, can two-part tariffs coordinate the channel and leave the retailer positive profit,
even if the retailer has no external opportunity? In other words, is it possible that the positive profit of the
retailer can be an endogenous outcome at equilibrium in which the supply chain is also coordinated?
To answer the above questions, this paper considers a stylized two-echelon supply chain with one
supplier and one retailer. The supplier is a Stackelberg leader who designs a menu of two-part tariff
contracts. The retailer is a Stackelberg follower who decides whether to accept a contract and which
contract to accept. The retailer will accept a contract if and only if he receives non-negative profit under
this contract. If the retailer accepts a contract, then he sets the retail price. The retailer faces a market
modeled as a linear city with a uniform distribution of consumers. A customer’s utility is dependent on
the retail price and the cost of travelling to the retailer. A customer will buy one unit of the product if s/he
receives non-negative utility. The utility function results in such a demand function: if the retail price is
sufficiently low, then the entire market is served or saturated and the price elasticity of market demand
becomes zero; if the retail price is sufficiently high, then the market demand decreases in retail price and
the market is unsaturated. This demand function captures a realistic aspect of market demand that many
other demand functions do not have: the market can and will be saturated if the price is sufficiently low.
As will be shown later in the paper, this aspect actually helps the retailer fight for a reasonable profit in a
supplier-dominated supply chain without sacrificing channel coordination. If the supplier gets too greedy,
the retailer can raise the retail price correspondingly. At the tipping price point between a saturated
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market and an unsaturated one, an increase in retail price will hurt the profit of the supplier more than that
of the retailer. In addition, similar to Çakanyıldırım et al. (2012), information asymmetry is introduced
into the model: the supplier does not know the exact value of the unit transportation cost, while the
retailer does. Using an adverse selection model to capture the information asymmetry, this paper shows
that the retailer facing low transportation cost can leverage his market knowledge advantage over the
supplier to obtain a positive profit at equilibrium where the channel coordination is also achieved.
A motivation of our stylized model is Costco Business Centers (not the regular Costco
warehouse), which aim at small business owners like those who operate restaurants, food trucks, and
convenience stores. The products available at Costco Business Centers include staples and dry goods,
fresh and frozen meats, produce, other food products, candy, gum, cigarettes, soft drinks, snacks, beer and
wine, office supplies, etc. Costco charges business members a membership fee in addition to unit price.
While Costco appears dominant over its small business members, these small business owners have
information advantage regarding their customers. It is not worthwhile for Costco to investigate the small
market that each small business serves. Small business owners can leverage their information advantage
over the powerful Costco for reasonable profit.
The key contribution of the paper is that it provides an alternative explanation to the prevalent
two-part tariffs in practice. To the best of our knowledge, the existing supply chain coordination literature
has the following relevant findings: (1) under full information, two-part tariffs can coordinate supply
chains but leave the retailer zero profit if the retailer has no external opportunity; (2) under information
asymmetry, two-part tariffs cannot coordinate supply chains. Motivated by Costco Business Centers, we
incorporate customer heterogeneity, near-saturated retail market, and asymmetric information into a
stylized model. The retailer has the knowledge of customer heterogeneity while the supplier does not. The
supplier, on the other hand, designs a menu of two-part tariffs for the retailer to choose from. We have
found that two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information, while leaving
the retailer a positive profit. In addition, a one-size-fits-all two-part tariff can coordinate the supply chain
at equilibrium, i.e., there is no need for the supplier to design different two-part tariffs for the retailer who
may possess different types of information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review related literature in Section 2. In
Section 3, the models under fully information and under information asymmetry are introduced. Section 4
presents the model results and insights. Summary of the paper is provided in Section 5.

2. Relation to Literature
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A large number of supply chain management studies have been focused on contracting issues (for
an excellent review, see Cachon 2003, Swaminathan et al. 2003, Huang et al. 2003, Chan et al. 2010),
because supply chain contracts are effective tools to coordinate supply chains by eliminating double
marginalization. Examples of such contracts include, among others, buyback contracts (Pasternack, 1985),
revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005), quantity flexibility contracts (Tsay, 1999), and
quantity discount contracts (Weng, 1995). Some literature presents scenarios that supply chain can be
coordinated through contracts. Sabbaghi et al. (2007) found that wholesale price contracts can coordinate
the channel when the manufacturer is capacity-constrained, with the retail price exogenously given.
Hematyar et al. (2014) found that rebate contracts can achieve supply chain coordination when the retailer
is a newsvendor facing price dependent stochastic demand. Our paper builds upon this stream of literature
by specifically examining when two-part tariffs can coordinate a supply chain under asymmetric
information.
A more relevant stream of literature studies supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs under
full information. Two-part tariffs have been advocated as a way to coordinate a supply chain (Zusman and
Etgar, 1981). Moorthy (1987) argued that a two-part tariff can motivate the retailer to set the channelprofit maximizing price in a decentralized channel. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) considered a two-part
tariff contract that coordinates a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral distributor. A two-part tariff can not
only increase order quantity of the retailers to the optimal level, but also maximize the distributor's
expected profit. Chen and Yang (2014) found that reinforcement/punishment contracts with a two-part
tariff can perfectly coordinate a supply chain in which the production of the primary supplier is subject to
random yield and the buyer has an emergency backup sourcing. In particular, Corbett et al. (2004)
concluded that two-part tariffs can coordinate a two-echelon supply chain under full information.
However, the retailer would receive zero profit if he does not have external opportunity. Corbett et al.
(2004) also looked into two-part tariffs under asymmetric information, which will be discussed later.
Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information has also been modeled in literature (Ha
2001, Zhang 2010). In most of these literatures, adverse selection models have been adopted. The
principals design a menu of contracts. The agents, typically with information advantage over the
principals, select the contracts that benefit them the most. Focusing on buyback contracts, Babich et al.
(2012) considered a model of asymmetric demand information in which the retailer possesses private
information about the demand distribution. They found that the supplier’s optimal buyback contract leads
to the first-best solution with the supplier keeping the entire channel’s profit. In a two-echelon supply
chain where the retailer is modeled as a newsvendor, Wang et al. (2012) concluded that a retailerimplemented two-part tariff, in which the retailer charges an upfront lump sum fee when he does not
know the manufacturer’s unit production cost, performs substantially better than many commonly used
4

contracts. This retailer-implemented two-part tariff contract, however, is unable to coordinate the supply
chain. In a setting with demand risk where the retailer has hidden information on service level, Lutze and
Ozer (2008) found that a promised lead-time contract benefits both the supplier and the retailer in risk
sharing. In addition, under information asymmetry where the supplier does not know the retailer’s cost
structure, Corbett et al. (2004) found that two-part tariffs cannot coordinate the supply chain.
Table 1 summarizes some key similarities and differences in major assumptions between our
work and the relevant papers.
Table 1: Key Similarities and Differences in Model Assumptions
Information
Wang et al.
(2012)
Moorthy
(1987)

Symmetric
Symmetric

Contract Type
Retailer-implemented
two-part tariffs

Demand

Two-part tariffs

Deterministic

Deterministic

Symmetric and
asymmetric

Reinforcement/punish
ment contracts with
two-part tariff
Two-part tariffs and
other contracts

Asymmetric

Buyback

Stochastic

Chen et al.
(2012)

Symmetric

Two-part tariffs

Deterministic

This work

Asymmetric

Two-part tariffs

Deterministic

Chen and
Yang (2014)
Corbett et al.
(2004)
Babich et al.
(2012)

Symmetric

Stochastic
Deterministic

Channel Structure
One supplier one
retailer
One supplier one
retailer
One supplier, one
buyer with backup
sourcing
One supplier one
retailer
One supplier one
retailer
Dual channel; one
supplier with direct
channel and retailer
One supplier one
retailer

As shown in Table 1, our work is most closely related to Corbett et al. (2004) in terms of key assumptions.
As noted earlier, in Corbett et al. (2004), two-part tariffs can coordinate a supplier-retailer channel but
leave the retailer zero profit under full information; and two-part tariffs cannot coordinate the supply
chain with asymmetric information. By introducing heterogeneous customers and near-saturated market
into the model, we contribute to the existing literature on supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs
with the following findings: (1) two-part tariffs can coordinate a supplier-retailer supply chain even under
asymmetric information; (2) the retailer may receive positive profit at equilibrium when the supply chain
is coordinated without turning to external opportunities; and (3) under certain conditions, it is not
necessary for the supplier to differentiate the types of the retailer and one two-part tariff designed for all
types may coordinate the supply chain as well.
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3. Models
In this section, we present our models, first a base model under full information, then the model
under information asymmetry.
3.1 The Base Model under Full Information
Consider a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier S, and one retailer R. The retailer faces a
market modeled as a linear city on the interval [0, 1] with density 1. Consumers are distributed uniformly
along this interval. The retailer is located in the middle of the linear city at ½. This assumption can be
relaxed by allowing the retailer to be located at the end point, and our qualitative results will continue to
hold. The supply chain dynamics are modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game. First, the supplier
determines the terms of the two-part tariff supply contract (w, F), where w is the unit wholesale price and
F is the franchise fee or membership fee. After knowing the terms of the supply contract, the retailer
chooses his retail price, p. The marginal costs of producing or selling one unit of product is normalized to
zero for simplicity.
A consumer who is located at ½ – x (or ½ + x) receives a utility of 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑡𝑥, where 1 is the
reservation price of all potential consumers, t is the unit transportation cost, and x is the distance from this
consumer to the retail store. Therefore, a customer at 𝑥 = (1 − 𝑝)/𝑡 receives zero utility. The resulting
demand function of the retailer is as follows:
𝑞=

1
2(1 − 𝑝)/𝑡

𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓

𝑝 ≤ 1 − 𝑡/2
1 − 𝑡/2 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1

(1)

This demand function captures the scenario of saturated or near-saturated market, which is a focal point
of this work. A similar but more complicated demand function can be seen in Yang et al. (2010). To
investigate the manufacturer's optimal mail-in rebate decision in the face of the retailer’ ability to raise
price, Yang et al. (2010) derived the demand model from the consumer's utility which depends on the
manufacturer's rebate, the manufacturer’s suggested retail price, as well as the actual retail price.
Conditional on the contract (w, F), the retailer sets optimal retail price to maximize his profit, YR.
Max 𝑌4 = 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑞 − 𝐹

(2)
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The optimal retail price as a function of the wholesale price w can be easily derived from the first-order
condition of the maximization problem in (2):
𝑝∗ =

1 − 𝑡/2
(1 + 𝑤)/2

𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓

𝑤 ≤1−𝑡
1−𝑡 ≤𝑤 ≤1

(3)

The resulting demand as a function of w is as follows
𝑞(𝑤) =

1
(1 − 𝑤)/𝑡

𝑖𝑓
𝑖𝑓

𝑤 ≤1−𝑡
1−𝑡 ≤𝑤 ≤1

(4)
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The supplier then maximizes her profit, YS, by setting w and F. The supplier’s unit production cost is
normalized to zero for simplicity. This assumption also makes a saturated market possible in this work.
The supplier’s profit-maximization problem is thus as follows:
Max 𝑌= = 𝑤 ∗ 𝑞 𝑤 + 𝐹, subject to 𝑌4 ≥ 0

(5)

:,<

Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the basic model under full information is as follows:
any 𝑤 ∗ ∈ [0, 1 − 𝑡], 𝐹 ∗ = 1 − 𝑡/2 − 𝑤 ∗ , 𝑝 ∗ = 1 − 𝑡/2, 𝑞 ∗ = 1, 𝑌=∗ = 1 − 𝑡/2, 𝑌4∗ = 0. (6)
In the case of fully integrated supply chain, the channel will choose p to maximize the channel’s profit,
𝑀𝑎𝑥2 𝑌 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑞(𝑝). It is easy to see that in the integrated supply chain, the optimal price is less than or
equal to 1 − 𝑡/2, the optimal demand is 1, and the optimal channel profit is 1 − 𝑡/2. Proposition 1 shows
that two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply chain. But the retailer receives zero profit at equilibrium
under two-part tariffs. This effect will be coped with the fact that the retailer has better market knowledge
than the supplier in our model. This model of asymmetric information is introduced next.
3.2 The Model under Asymmetric Information
In a standard adverse selection model such as the ones in Vives (1999) in economics, and Lutze
and Ozer (2008) in operations, the agents typically own some private information unavailable to the
principal(s). The principals thus design a menu of contracts, one for each possible type of the agents. Each
agent, based on his or her own type, will then choose the contract that benefits him or her the most.
Following the aforementioned conventional adverse selection models, we suppose that the
supplier (the principal) does not know customers' unit transportation cost t, but the retailer does. The
supplier believes that t follows a Bernoulli distribution: a consumer has a low unit transportation cost (𝑡 =
𝑡F ) with probability 𝜋, and a high unit transportation cost (𝑡 = 𝑡H ) with probability 1 − 𝜋, where 𝑡F < 𝑡H .
A retailer facing 𝑡F (𝑡H ) is called 𝑡F -type (𝑡H -type) retailer. The supplier can offer a menu of two two-part
tariff contracts. These two contracts are: (𝑤F , 𝐹F ) and (𝑤H , 𝐹H ), where 𝑤F and 𝑤H are the wholesale prices
designated for the retailer when 𝑡 = 𝑡F and 𝑡 = 𝑡H , respectively; 𝐹F and 𝐹H are franchise fees designated
for the retailer when 𝑡 = 𝑡F and 𝑡 = 𝑡H , respectively. For the retailer, 𝑤F and 𝑤H are variable costs
whereas 𝐹F and 𝐹H are fixed costs. Similarly, 𝑝F and 𝑝H are the retail prices set by 𝑡F -type and 𝑡H -type
retailer, respectively. 𝑞F and 𝑞H are the demand faced by 𝑡F -type and 𝑡H -type retailer, respectively.
To maximize her expected profit, the supplier would like to design a menu of two two-part tariff
contracts so that 𝑡F -type retailer will choose (𝑤F , 𝐹F ), and 𝑡H -type retailer will choose (𝑤H , 𝐹H ). Assume
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that the supplier is risk neutral and thus she wants to maximize her expected profit 𝐸 𝑌= . The supplier’s
problem is then given by the following constrained optimization problem:
Max
s.t.

𝐸 𝑌K = 𝜋 𝑤F 𝑞F + 𝐹F + (1 − 𝜋)(𝑤H 𝑞H + 𝐹H )
𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F ≥ 0
𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H ≥ 0
𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F ≥ 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H − 𝐹H
𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H ≥ 𝑝H 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤F − 𝐹F

(7)
(IR1)
(IR2)
(IC1)
(IC2)

(IR1) and (IR2) are the individual rationality constraints for a 𝑡F -type and a 𝑡H -type retailer, respectively.
These constraints ensure that the retailer will obtain non-negative profit. (IC1) and (IC2) are the incentive
compatibility constraints for 𝑡F -type and 𝑡H -type retailer, respectively. These two constraints ensure that
the retailer facing 𝑡F will not choose (𝑤H , 𝐹H ) and the retailer facing 𝑡H will not choose (𝑤F , 𝐹F ). The
incentive compatibility constraints simply mean that the retailer will only choose the contract designed for
his type.
In order to find the optimal solution to the above model, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. At the optimum, 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H . As a result,
𝐹H = 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H .

(8)

Proof. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 indicates that (IR2) must be binding at optimum. In other words, the supplier will design the
menu of contracts so that t h -type retailer will receive zero profit.
Lemma 2. At the optimum, (IC1) must be binding. That is,
𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F = 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H − 𝐹H .

(9)

Lemma 2 shows that at optimum, a 𝑡F -type retailer will be indifferent between the two contracts, (𝑤F , 𝐹F )
and (𝑤H , 𝐹H ).
According to Lemmas 1 and 2, once the optimal values of 𝑤F and 𝑤H are known, it is
straightforward to compute the optimal values of 𝐹F and 𝐹H using Equations (8) and (9). The difficulty in
solving this optimization model, even after having been simplified by Lemmas 1 and 2, is that the
objective function is piece-wise differentiable. To deal with this difficulty, we consider all the possible
scenarios for the two wholesale prices. In principle, there are 25 scenarios. Thus, we identify the optimum
for each of the 25 scenarios one by one. The optimum of each scenario is called a local optimum. By
comparing all the local optima, we can obtain the global optimal solution(s) to the supplier’s optimization
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problem. The 25 possible scenarios of the combinations of the two wholesale prices are summarized in
Table 2 below.
Table 2: Possible Scenarios of Optimal Wholesale Prices
𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡H 𝑤H = 1 − 𝑡H 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F 𝑤H = 1 − 𝑡F
𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H
𝑤F = 1 − 𝑡H
1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡F
𝑤F = 1 − 𝑡F
1 − 𝑡F < 𝑤F < 1

S1
(LWS*)
S6
(LWS*)
S11
(infeasible)
S16
(infeasible)

S2
(LWS*)
S7
(LWS*)
S12
(infeasible)
S17
(infeasible)

S21
(infeasible)

S22
(infeasible)

S3
(infeasible)
S8
(infeasible)
S13
(infeasible)
S18
(infeasible)
S23
(infeasible)

1 − 𝑡F < 𝑤H < 1

S4
(FWS **)
S9
(FWS**)
S14
(FWS**)
S19
(FWS**)

S5
(HWS***)
S10
(HWS***)
S15
(HWS***)
S20
(HWS***)

S24
(infeasible)

S25
(infeasible)

*. LWS: low wholesale price strategy in which 𝑤H is less than or equal to 1 − 𝑡H .
**. FWS: fixed wholesale price strategy in which 𝑤H is fixed to be 1 − 𝑡F .
***. HWS: high wholesale price strategy in which 𝑤H is higher than 1 − 𝑡F .

In Table 1, “infeasible” means that the globally optimal solution does not exist in this scenario. As will be
formally shown in Lemma 3 below, out of the 25 possible scenarios, there are 13 infeasible scenarios.
Lemma 3. The following 13 scenarios cannot be globally optimal: S3, S8, S11, S12, S13, S16, S17, S18,
S21, S22, S23, S23, and S25.
Lemma 3 indicates that the globally optimal solution does not exist in the above 13 scenarios.
Consequently, the globally optimal solution for the supplier can only be in the remaining 12 scenarios.
We group the remaining scenarios into three groups, according to different two-part tariff contracts
offered. Please note that for scenarios in the same group, they have identical optimal retail price, demand,
the supplier’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. Scenarios S1, S2, S6 and S7 are in the same group, which is
named as low wholesale price strategy (LWS). Similarly, we name the group including scenarios S4, S9,
S14, and S19 fixed wholesale price strategy (FWS), and the group including scenarios S5, S10, S15 and
S20 high wholesale price strategy (HWS). In the next section, we will show that each of the three
strategies can be globally optimal, depending on the values of the parameters.
4. Analyses and Results
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In this section, we first present the optimal two-part tariff contract for each scenario of the three
strategies (LWS, FWS, and HWS). We then identify the globally optimal two-part tariff contracts at the
end of the section.
Proposition 2. The optimal two-part tariff contracts offered by the supplier in the low wholesale price
strategy (LWS) are as follows, and the contracts can coordinate the supply chain regardless of the type of
the retailer.
Retailer
type

𝑙-type

ℎ-type

S1: (any 𝑤 less than 1 − 𝑡H , 1 −

PQ

S2: (any 𝑤 less than 1 − 𝑡H , 1 −

PQ

(𝑤, 𝐹)
S6: (1 − 𝑡H , 1 −
S7: (1 − 𝑡H ,

PQ
R

PQ
R

R

R

− 𝑤F )

S1: (any 𝑤 less than 1 − 𝑡H , 1 −

− 𝑤F )

S2: (1 − 𝑡H , Q )

− 𝑤H )

R

S7: (1 − 𝑡H ,

)

R

P

S6: (any 𝑤 less than 1 − 𝑡H , 1 −

)

PQ

PQ
R

PQ
R

− 𝑤H )

)

The other local optimum results of the low wholesale price strategy, along with the other two
strategies, are summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 indicates that, in scenarios S1, S2, and S6, the retailer, regardless of the type, will
choose the two-part tariff contract designed for him. In other words, the 𝑡F -type retailer will not choose
the contract designed for the 𝑡H -type retailer, and vice versa. This finding implies that the supplier is able
to differentiate the 𝑡F -type retailer from the 𝑡H -type retailer by the retailer’s choice of the contract. This
outcome is referred to as a separating equilibrium in economics, meaning that different types of retailer
will choose different types of contracts. In S7, however, the supplier offers identical contracts to either
type of the retailer. This result is referred to as a pooling equilibrium, meaning that the supplier does not
differentiate different types of the retailer. The pooling equilibrium is of particular and practical
importance and interest. For example, Costco Business Centers simply have one membership fee and all
members pay the same prices for the products. This one-size-fits-all two-part tariff is much easier to
implement. As we will see in Proposition 5 later on, LWS can be globally optimal. And thus, one-sizefits-all two-part tariff can possibly coordinate the supply chain.
It is worth noting that supply chain coordination can be achieved in a pooling or a separating
equilibrium while the wholesale prices 𝑤F and 𝑤H are relatively low. Thus, we call this contract offering
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low wholesale price strategy (LWS). Proposition 2 suggests that a supply chain coordinator can always
induce supply chain coordination by setting a proper price ceiling at 1 − 𝑡H .
The most exciting takeaway from Proposition 2 is that the supply chain can be coordinated with
two-part tariffs regardless of the type of the retailer. In fact, regardless of the type of the retailer, the entire
market will be served. Furthermore, the 𝑡F -type retailer obtains a positive profit

PQ SPT
R

and the 𝑡H -type

retailer will always receive zero profit because (IR2) is always binding according to Lemma 1. At this
moment, it is not clear yet whether the supplier will choose this strategy. In other words, we do not know
yet whether LWS can be globally optimal. As will be demonstrated in Proposition 5 later, LWS is indeed
globally optimal for the supplier as long as the probability that the retailer is of 𝑡F -type is sufficiently low.
Proposition 3. The optimal two-part tariff contracts offered by the supplier in the fixed wholesale price
strategy (FWS) are as follows, and the supply chain can be coordinated if the retailer is of tl -type.
Retailer
type

𝑙-type

ℎ-type

S4: (Any 𝑤 less than 1 − 𝑡H , 1 − 𝑡F − 𝑤F +
(𝑤, 𝐹)

S9: (1 − 𝑡H , 𝑡H − 𝑡F +

PTU
RPQ

PTU
RPQ

)

)

S14: (Any 𝑤 between 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡F , 1 − 𝑡F − 𝑤F +
S19: (1 − 𝑡F ,

PTU
RPQ

S4, S9, S14, and S19:

PTU
RPQ

(1 − 𝑡F ,
)

PTU
RPQ

)

)

According to Proposition 3, on one hand, the locally optimal two-part tariffs offered to the 𝑡H -type retailer
are the same in the four scenarios. The two-part tariffs offered to the 𝑡F -type retailer, on the other hand,
are different. The locally optimal contracts offered in S4, S9 and S14 are separating equilibria because
different types of retailer will choose different contracts. The locally optimal contracts offered in S19,
however, consist of a pooling equilibrium because the same contracts are offered to different types of
retailer. Noting that the optimal wholesale prices for 𝑡H -type is always 1 − 𝑡F , we call these contracts high
wholesale price strategies (FWS).
The most important finding in Proposition 3 is that the two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply
chain and the market is fully served if the retailer is of the 𝑡F -type. In addition, the supplier is better off if
the retailer is of the 𝑡F -type, because her profit is always higher than otherwise. Moreover, it is easy to
verify that if the retailer is more likely to be of the 𝑡F -type, then it is better for the supplier to choose FWS
than LWS; if the retailer is more likely to be of the 𝑡H -type, then it is better for the supplier to choose
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LWS than FWS. However, unlike in Proposition 2, the market will not be fully served if the retailer is of
the 𝑡H -type. It is not surprising to see that the 𝑡H -type retailer receives zero profit.
We will show later on that FWS is globally optimal for the supplier when the probability that the
retailer is of the 𝑡F -type is sufficiently high.
Proposition 4. The optimal two-part tariff contracts offered by the supplier in the high wholesale price
strategy (HWS) are as follows, and the supply chain can be coordinated if the retailer is of tl -type.
Retailer
type

𝑙-type

ℎ-type

S5: (Any 𝑤 < 1 − 𝑡H , 1 −
PQ SPT VS:Q

U

RPQ PT

(𝑤, 𝐹)

S10: (1 − 𝑡H ,

PT
R

− 𝑤F −

WPQ PT SPQ U SPTU
RPT

)

S15: (Any 𝑤 ∈ (1 − 𝑡H , 1 − 𝑡F ), 1 −
𝑤F −

PQ SPT VS:Q U
)
RPQ PT

S20: (1 − 𝑡F ,

PQ SPT U
RPQ

S5, S10, S15, and S20:

)

PT
R

−

(

𝜋 𝑡H − 𝑡F
𝜋 − 1 R 𝑡FR
,
)
𝜋𝑡H + 1 − 2𝜋 𝑡F 2𝑡H 𝜋𝑡H + 1 − 2𝜋 𝑡F R

)

Proposition 4 signifies that the locally optimal two-part tariffs offered to the 𝑡H -type retailer are the same
in any of the four scenarios. At the local optimum, the wholesale price offered to the 𝑡F -type must be less
than or equal to 1 − 𝑡F . Unlike in Propositions 2 and 3, none of the four optimal two-part tariffs consist of
a pooling equilibrium in that different types of retailer will always select a different contract.
Once again, the channel will be coordinated with two-part tariffs and the entire market will be
served if the retailer is of the 𝑡F -type. Nevertheless, if the retailer is of the 𝑡H -type, then the market will
only be partially served and the retailer will receive zero profit. Similar to Proposition 3, the supplier is
better off if the retailer is of 𝑡F -type. The high wholesale price strategy will be shown to be globally
optimal for the supplier if the probability that the retailer is of the 𝑡F -type is not too high or too low.
Proposition 5. The supplier’s globally optimal two-part tariff contracts are as follows:
if 0 < 𝜋 < 𝜋V , then LWS is globally optimal,
if 𝜋V < 𝜋 < 𝜋R , then HWS is globally optimal, and
if 𝜋R < 𝜋 < 1, then FWS is globally optimal.
The values of 𝜋V and 𝜋R are:
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𝜋V =

SXY Z XYU S[\]Y
R\

and 𝜋R =

SXU Z XUU S[\]U
R\

,

(10)

where
𝐴 = 2 − 𝑡F 𝑡H − 𝑡F

R

+ 𝑡F 1 − 𝑡F

R

> 0,

𝐵V = − 𝑡H 𝑡H − 𝑡F 2 − 𝑡H − 𝑡F + 2𝑡F 1 − 𝑡H
𝐶V = 𝑡F 1 − 𝑡H

R

R

< 0,

> 0,

𝐵R = 𝑡H 𝑡F 2 − 𝑡F − 2𝑡F − 𝑡H − 2𝑡F 2𝑡H 1 − 𝑡F + 𝑡FR < 0, and
(11)

𝐶R = 𝑡F (1 − 𝑡F )(1 − 2𝑡H + 𝑡F ).

If the supplier’s subjective probability that 𝑡 = 𝑡F is lower than the threshold value of 𝜋V , then
LWS generates the highest expected profit for the supplier. If the supplier’s subjective probability that
𝑡 = 𝑡F is higher than the threshold value of 𝜋R , then FWS generates the highest expected profit for the
supplier. In the end, if the supplier’s subjective probability that 𝑡 = 𝑡F is between 𝜋V and 𝜋R , then HWS
generates the highest expected profit for the supplier. Proposition 5 is straightforward. First, if the
probability that the retailer is of 𝑡F -type is sufficiently low (less than 𝜋V ), then consumers are likely to
make the purchase when retail price is sufficiently low. Therefore, LWS is the supplier’s globally optimal
strategy to induce low retail price. Second, if the probability that the retailer is of 𝑡F -type is sufficiently
high (greater than 𝜋R ), then the demand can still be relatively high when the retail price is high. As a
result, FWS is the globally optimal strategy of the supplier to better extract profit from the retailer and
consumers. Third, if the probability that the retailer is of 𝑡F -type is between 𝜋V and 𝜋R , then HWS is the
globally optimal strategy.
Proposition 5, together with Propositions 2, 3, and 4, confirms that the channel coordination will
always be achieved if the retailer is of 𝑡F -type. In this case, the entire market is served and the retailer
receives positive profit. If the retailer is of 𝑡H -type, however, the channel will be coordinated and the
market will be fully served in LWS, but not in FWS and HWS. The 𝑡H -type always receives zero profit.
It is important to note that both the supplier and the retailer are better off if the transportation cost
𝑡 is low (𝑡 = 𝑡F ). However, if the supplier knows the exact transportation cost, then the supplier will take
advantage of the situation and leave the retailer zero profit, even though the channel will be coordinated
(Proposition 1). Consider a more general model in which the transportation cost t can take on n possible
values ranging from 𝑡F to 𝑡H with positive probabilities. It is easy to see that Lemmas 1 and 2 can be
generalized to this general model. Therefore, only retailer facing 𝑡H will receive zero profit. In the other
𝑛 − 1 cases, retailer obtains positive profit at equilibrium.
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5. Summary
Built upon a linear city model of market demand, this paper introduces two new elements into the
study of supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs: (1) a near-saturated market, (2) information
asymmetry in which the retailer has better market knowledge than the supplier. To be more specific, the
retailer knows the exact transportation cost of customers whereas the supplier does not.
This paper has added three important and interesting results to the existing supply chain
coordination literature. First, it shows that a two-echelon supply chain can be coordinated with two-part
tariffs under asymmetric information. Much scholarly attention has been paid to other forms of supply
contracts, such as buy-back contracts, quantity flexibility contracts, revenue sharing contracts, and
quantity discount contracts. Two-part tariffs, together with arguably most popular supply contractwholesale price contract, receive much less attention. One possible reason is that contracts like buy-back
can coordinate supply chains in theory while two-part tariffs and wholesale price contracts cannot in
general. The first major contribution of this paper fills such a gap by providing a theoretical explanation
to the prevalence of two-part tariffs: two-part tariffs are capable of coordinating supply chains.
In the existing literature, when two-part tariffs do achieve channel coordination under full
information, the retailer receives zero profit. This result is apparently at odds with reality, and is probably
another reason why two-part tariffs receive less scholarly attention. The existing explanation to this
unpleasant property is the introduction of external opportunity for the retailer. Thus, the second major
contribution of this paper is to have shown that the retailer can receive positive profit in a supply chain
coordinated with two-part tariffs under information asymmetry. This is an endogenous equilibrium result.
Lastly, from a practical standpoint, it is rare that a supplier designs a menu of two-part tariffs. Our
results have shown that the supplier can design a one-size-fits-all two-part tariff to maximize her own
expect profit while coordinating the supply chain. It is true in both the low-wholesale-price strategy (LWS)
and the fixed-wholesale-price strategy (FWS).
This paper opens a door to many possible opportunities for future research. First, in this work, the
supplier is the Stackelberg leader while the retailer is the follower. In some industries, however, retailers
are the more powerful players than the suppliers. It will be interesting to investigate whether two-part
tariffs, especially designed by the retailer, can coordinate the channel. Second, the information asymmetry
considered in this paper is the retailer’s better market knowledge, condensed into one parameter -consumers’ unit transportation cost. It is worthwhile looking into other forms of information asymmetry,
such as the retailer’s own cost. Third, this paper studies a near-saturated market in which two-part tariffs
can coordinate the supply chain. However, it is still unclear whether two-part tariffs can coordinate the
14

supply chain in an unsaturated market. Fourth, this paper adopts an adverse selection model from
Economics. Is it possible to employ moral hazard model in a similar fashion? We view this direction as a
potential path for continued research.
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Appendix:

Strategies

Retailer
Type

Table 3: Local Optimum of LWS, FWS, and HWS
Retail
Supplier’s
Retailer’s
Demand
Price
Profit
Profit

Supply
Chain’s Profit

𝑡F
𝑡H
𝑡H − 𝑡F
𝑡F
1
1−
1−
2
2
2
2
LWS
𝑡H
𝑡H
𝑡H
1
0
h-type
1−
1−
1−
2
2
2
𝑡F
𝑡F
𝑡FR
𝑡H
𝑡FR
l-type
1
1−
1−
1 − 𝑡F +
−
2
2
2𝑡H
2 2𝑡H
FWS
R
𝑡F
𝑡F
1 − 𝑡F 𝑡F
𝑡F
1 − 𝑡F 𝑡F
𝑡FR
0
h-type
1−
+
+
𝑡H
2
𝑡H
2𝑡H
𝑡H
2𝑡H
𝑡F
𝑡F
𝑡H − 𝑡F 1 − 𝑤H R
𝑡H − 𝑡F 1 − 𝑤H R
𝑡F
1
l-type
1−
1− −
1−
2
2
2𝑡H 𝑡F
2𝑡H 𝑡F
2
HWS
1 − 𝑤H
1 + 𝑤H
1 − 𝑤HR
1 − 𝑤HR
h-type
0
𝑡H
2
2𝑡H
2𝑡H
Note: LWS is low wholesale price strategy, FWS is fixed wholesale price strategy, and HWS is high wholesale price
strategy.

l-type

1−

Proof of Results
1. Proof of Proposition 1
It is obvious that when 𝑤 ≤ 1 − 𝑡, the optimal 𝑤 is 1 − 𝑡. The resulting values of F, p, q, 𝑌= , and 𝑌4 will
be 𝑡/2, 1 – 𝑡/2, 1, 1 − 𝑡/2, and 0, respectively.
When 𝑤 ≥ 1 − 𝑡, the first-order condition yields that the optimal w is ½. The resulting values of F, p, q,
𝑌= , and 𝑌4 will be 1/(8𝑡), ¾, 1/(2𝑡), 3/(8𝑡), and 0, respectively. But this is true only if 𝑤 ≥ 1 − 𝑡, or
equivalently, 𝑡 ≥ ½. When 𝑡 ≥ ½, it can be easily shown that 1 − 𝑡/2 is greater than 3/(8𝑡). Therefore,
w* = 1 − 𝑡 will be the only optimal wholesale price. ■
2. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider three possible scenarios of 𝑤H , respectively. These are: (a) 𝑤H ≤ 1 − 𝑡H < 1 − 𝑡F ; (b) 1 − 𝑡H <
𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F ; and (c) 1 − 𝑡H < 1 − 𝑡F ≤ 𝑤H < 1.
In case (a), 𝑝H = 1 − 𝑡H /2, 𝑝F = 1 − 𝑡F /2, and 𝑞H = 𝑞F = 1. This is directly from equations (2)
and (3). So,
𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1 −

PT

𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H = 1 −
It is obvious that 1 −

PT
R

>1−

PQ
R

− 𝑤H

R
PQ
R

− 𝑤H .

. Thus, 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H .

In case (b), 𝑝H = (1 + 𝑤H )/2, 𝑝F = 1 − 𝑡F /2, 𝑞H = 1 − 𝑤H /𝑡H , and 𝑞F = 1. Let 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑤H .
Since 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F , it must be true that 𝑡F < 𝑥 < 𝑡H . Therefore,
𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1 −

PT
R

− 𝑤H = 𝑥 −
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PT
R

VS:Q U

𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H =
Let 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑥 −

PT
R

−

fU

=

RPQ

fU
RPQ

.

for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑡F , 𝑡H . Obviously, 𝑓 gg 𝑥 =

RPQ

V
PQ

> 0 and thus, 𝑓 𝑥 reaches maximum

when 𝑓 g 𝑥 = 0 or equivalently, when 𝑥 = 𝑡H . So, 𝑓 𝑥 increases in x for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑡F , 𝑡H . Thus, 𝑓 𝑥 reaches
its minimum at 𝑥 = 𝑡F . 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑡F =

PT (PQ SPT )
RPQ

> 0. Therefore, 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅

𝑞H 𝑤H is also true in case (b).
In case (c), 𝑝H = 𝑝F = (1 + 𝑤H )/2, 𝑞H = 1 − 𝑤H /𝑡H , and 𝑞F = (1 − 𝑤H )/𝑡F .
𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H =

VS:Q U

𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H =

RPT
VS:Q U
RPQ

.

It is obvious that 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H . According to constraint (IC1), the
following must be true:
𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F ≥ 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H − 𝐹H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H .
If 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H is not equal to zero, then the supplier can increase 𝐹F and 𝐹H by the same
amount simultaneously without violating any constraint. Thus, at the optimum, it must be true that
𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H = 0. This completes the proof. ■
3. Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that Lemma 2 is not true. That is, 𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F > 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H − 𝐹H .
Based on Lemma 1 and the assumption, the following must be true:
𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F > 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H − 𝐹H > 𝑝H 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤H − 𝐹H = 0.
Thus, the supplier can benefit from increasing 𝐹F by a small amount without violating any constraint.
Consequently, at optimum, it must be true that 𝑝F 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤F − 𝐹F = 𝑝F 𝑤H − 𝑤H ⋅ 𝑞F 𝑤H −
𝐹H . ■
4. Proof of Lemma 3.
S3: 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F is infeasible at optimum.
According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
𝑝H 𝑤H =

VZ:Q
R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H =

VS:Q
PQ

, 𝑝H 𝑤F = 1 −

PQ
R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F = 1.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H =

VS:Q U
RPQ

and 𝐹F = 𝑤H − 𝑤F + 𝐹H .

It can be verified that IC2 is also satisfied. The expected profit of the supplier is
𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝑤H − 𝑤F +
= 𝜋𝑤H +

VSh :Q (VS:Q )
PQ

+

VS:Q U

RPQ
VS:Q U

+ 1−𝜋

𝑤H

VS:Q
PQ

RPQ

The first-order condition for maximizing 𝐸 𝑌= yields
𝑤H =

h(VSPQ )

.

RhSV
h(VSPQ )

In order for 𝑤H =

RhSV

to maximize 𝐸 𝑌= , it must be true that
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+

VS:Q U
RPQ

i U j kl
i:QU

RhSV

=

PQ

V

< 0 or 𝜋 < .
R

V

h(VSPQ )

R

RhSV

But if 𝜋 < , then 𝑤H =

< 0. The conflict indicates that there is no such optimal solution that

𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F .
S8: 𝑤F = 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F is infeasible at optimum.
According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
VZ:Q

𝑝H 𝑤H =

R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H =

VS:Q
PQ

, 𝑝H 𝑤F = 1 −

PQ
R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F = 1.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H =

VS:Q U

and 𝐹F = 𝑤H − 𝑤F + 𝐹H .

RPQ

It can be verified that IC2 is also satisfied. The expected profit of the supplier is thus
𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝐹F + 1 − 𝜋
VS:Q U

= 𝜋 𝑤H +
= 𝜋𝑤H +

RPQ

+ 1−𝜋

VSh :Q (VS:Q )
PQ

+

𝑤H

VS:Q

𝑤H

VS:Q

PQ
PQ

+ 𝐹H
+

VS:Q U
RPQ

VS:Q U
RPQ

The first-order condition for maximizing 𝐸 𝑌= yields
𝑤H =

h(VSPQ )

In order for 𝑤H =
iUj

kl

i:QU

.

WhSR
h(VSPQ )

=

WhSR
WhSR
PQ

to maximize 𝐸 𝑌= , it must be true that
R

< 0 or 𝜋 < .
W

R

h(VSPQ )

W

WhSR

But if 𝜋 < , then 𝑤H =

< 0. The conflict indicates that there is no such optimal solution that

𝑤F = 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡F .
S11, S12, and S13 are similar. Here we prove that the optimal solution cannot be in S11.
S11: 1 − 𝑡H < 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡F and 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡H is infeasible at optimum.
According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
𝑝H 𝑤H = 1 −

PQ
R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H = 1, 𝑝H 𝑤F =

VZ:T
R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F =

VS:T
PQ

.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤H and 𝐹F = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤F .

𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝐹F + 1 − 𝜋 𝑤H + 𝐹H = 1 −

PQ
R

.

Constraint IC2 requires that 𝐹F ≥ 𝑝H 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤F , which is equivalent to
1−

PQ
R

− 𝑤F ≥

VS:T U
RPQ

⇔ 1 − 𝑤F

R

− 2𝑡H (1 − 𝑤F ) + 𝑡HR = 1 − 𝑤F − 𝑡H

R

≤ 0.

The above inequality is obviously false. Thus, the optimal wholesale prices cannot be in S11.
S16, S17, and S18 are similar. Here we prove that the optimal solution cannot be in S16.
S16: 𝑤F = 1 − 𝑡F and 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡H is infeasible at optimum.
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According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
PQ

𝑝H 𝑤H = 1 −

R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H = 1, 𝑝H 𝑤F =

VZ:T
R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F =

VS:T
PQ

.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤H and 𝐹F = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤F = 𝑡F −

PQ
R

𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝐹F + 1 − 𝜋 𝑤H + 𝐹H = 1 −

.

PQ
R

.

Constraint IC2 requires that 𝐹F ≥ 𝑝H 𝑤F − 𝑤F ⋅ 𝑞H 𝑤F , which is equivalent to
𝑡F −

PQ
R

VS:T U

≥

RPQ

=

PTU

RPQ

R

⇔ 𝑡H − 𝑡F

≤ 0.

The above inequality is obviously false. Thus, the optimal wholesale prices cannot be in S16.
S21-S25 are similar. Here we prove that the optimal solution cannot be in S21.
S21: 1 − 𝑡F < 𝑤F < 1 and 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡H is infeasible at optimum.
According to Equations (3) and (4),
𝑝F 𝑤F =

VZ:T

, 𝑞F 𝑤F =

R

𝑝H 𝑤H = 1 −

PQ
R

VS:T
PT

P

, 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,

, 𝑞H 𝑤H = 1, 𝑝H 𝑤F =

R
VZ:T

VS:T

R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F =

.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤H and 𝐹F =

VS:T U
RPT

−

PQ SPT
R

.

𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝐹F + 1 − 𝜋 𝑤H + 𝐹H =
ij kl
i:T

=

Sh:T
PT

h:T (VS:T )
PT

+

h VS:T U
RPT

−

h PQ SPT
R

+ (1 − 𝜋)(1 −

PQ
R

).

< 0.

Therefore, there exists no optimal solution within S21. ■
5. Proof of Proposition 2.
Here, we prove the results under S1. The results under S2, S6, and S7 can be shown in a similar fashion.
Note that in S1, 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H and 𝑤H < 1 − 𝑡H . According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
R
PQ

𝑝H 𝑤H = 𝑝H 𝑤F = 1 −

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H = 𝑞H 𝑤F = 1.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2
𝐹H = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤H and 𝐹F = 1 −

PQ
R

− 𝑤F .

It can be easily shown that IC2 is also active. The expected profit function of the supplier is
𝐸 𝑌= = 1 −

PQ
R

,

which is a constant. Therefore, 𝑤F and 𝑤H can assume any value less than 1 − 𝑡H . The resulting profit of
the 𝑡F -type retailer is 𝑌4 =

PQ SPT
R

.■

6. Proof of Proposition 3.
Here, we prove the results under S4. The results under S9, S14, and S19 can be shown in a similar fashion.
Note that in S4, 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H and 𝑤H = 1 − 𝑡F . According to Equations (3) and (4),
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P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 𝑝F 𝑤H = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 𝑞F 𝑤H = 1,
VZ:Q

𝑝H 𝑤H =

R

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H =

VS:Q

, 𝑝H 𝑤F = 1 −

PQ

PQ
R

, 𝑞H 𝑤F = 1.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H =

VS:Q U
RPQ

PTU

=

RPQ

and 𝐹F = 𝑤H − 𝑤F + 𝐹H .

It can be verified that IC2 is also satisfied. The expected profit of the supplier is
VS:Q U

𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤H +

=

RPQ

VSh :Q (VS:Q )

= 𝜋𝑤H +

+ 1−𝜋

PQ

VS:Q
PQ

VS:Q U

+

R VSPT hPQ Z VSh PT ZPTU
.
RPQ

𝑤H

VS:Q U

+

RPQ

RPQ

■

7. Proof of Proposition 4.
Here, we prove the results under S5. The results under S10, S15 and S20 can be shown in a similar
fashion. Note that in S5, 𝑤F < 1 − 𝑡H and 1 − 𝑡F < 𝑤H < 1. According to Equations (3) and (4),
P

𝑝F 𝑤F = 1 − T , 𝑞F 𝑤F = 1, 𝑝F 𝑤H =
R
VZ:Q

𝑝H 𝑤H =

R

, 𝑞H 𝑤H =

VS:Q
PQ

VZ:Q
R

, 𝑞F 𝑤H =

, 𝑝H 𝑤F = 1 −

PQ
R

VS:Q
PT

,

, 𝑞H 𝑤F = 1.

According to Lemmas 1 and 2,
𝐹H =

VS:Q U
RPQ

and 𝐹F = 1 −

PT
R

− 𝑤F −

VS:Q U
RPT

+

VS:Q U
RPQ

.

It can be verified that IC2 is also satisfied. The expected profit of the supplier is thus
𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 𝑤F + 𝐹F + 1 − 𝜋
= 𝜋(1 −

PT
R

VS:Q U

−

PT

RPT
h VS:Q U

R

RPT

= 𝜋(1 − ) −
ij kl
i:Q

i:QU

RPQ

+

PQ PT

𝑤H > 1 − 𝑡F ⇒ 𝜋 >
𝐸 𝑌= = 𝜋 1 −

PT
R

PQ

+ 𝐹H

+

𝑤H

VS:Q

PQ
VS:Q U
RPQ

+

VS:Q U
RPQ

.

.

< 0.

VSPT
VZPQ SRPT

+

PQ

VSh :Q (VS:Q )

hPQ Z(VSRh)PT

S[hPQ Z VSRh PT ]

=

VS:Q

)+ 1−𝜋

h(PQ SPT )

= 0 ⇒ 𝑤H =

i U j kl

VS:Q U

+

𝑤H

=1−

VSh U PT

PQ SPT
VZPQ SRPT

RPQ [hPQ Z VSRh PT ]

.

.■

8. Proof of Proposition 5.
The values of 𝜋V and 𝜋R are: 𝜋V =
𝐴 = 2 − 𝑡F 𝑡H − 𝑡F
𝐶V = 𝑡F 1 − 𝑡H

R

R

+ 𝑡F 1 − 𝑡F

SXY Z XYU S[\]Y
R\
R

and 𝜋R =

SXU Z XUU S[\]U
R\

, where

> 0, 𝐵V = − 𝑡H 𝑡H − 𝑡F 2 − 𝑡H − 𝑡F + 2𝑡F 1 − 𝑡H

R

< 0,

> 0, 𝐵R = 𝑡H 𝑡F 2 − 𝑡F − 2𝑡F − 𝑡H − 2𝑡F 2𝑡H 1 − 𝑡F + 𝑡FR < 0, and 𝐶R = 𝑡F (1 −

𝑡F )(1 − 2𝑡H + 𝑡F ).
From Proposition 2-4, the following is the local optimal expected profits of the supplier:
21

𝑌=op= = 1 −

PQ
R

(note that the expected profit here is a constant),

𝑌=<p= = 1 − 𝑡F +
𝑌=qp= = 𝜋 1 −

A

PTU
RPQ

PT

(note that the expected profit here is a constant), and

+

(VSh)U PT

(valid if and only if 𝜋 >

R
RPQ hPQ Z(VSRh)PT
op=
comparison between 𝑌=
and 𝑌=<p= finds that
RSPQ SPT
𝑌=op= > 𝑌=<p= if 𝜋 <
,
R(VSPT )
RSPQ SPT
𝑌=op= < 𝑌=<p= if 𝜋 >
.
R(VSP )

VSPT
VZPQ SRPT

).

T

A

comparison between 𝑌=op= and 𝑌=qp=
𝑌=op= > 𝑌=qp= if 𝜋Vg < 𝜋 < 𝜋V

finds that

where
𝜋Vg =

SXY S XYU S[\]Y
R\

and 𝜋V =

But it can be shown that 𝜋Vg <

SXY Z XYU S[\]Y
R\

VSPT
VZPQ SRPT

< 𝜋V <

(as defined in Proposition 5).

RSPQ SPT
R(VSPT )

. Therefore, 𝑌=op= is greater than 𝑌=<p= and 𝑌=qp=

when 𝜋 < 𝜋V . That is, LWS is globally optimal when 𝜋 < 𝜋V .
A comparison between 𝑌=<p= and 𝑌=qp= finds that
𝑌=<p= < 𝑌=qp= if 𝜋Rg < 𝜋 < 𝜋R
where
𝜋Rg =

SXU S XUU S[\]U
R\

and 𝜋R =

It can be shown that 𝜋Rg < 𝜋V < 𝜋R <

SXU Z XUU S[\]U
R\
RSPQ SPT
R(VSPT )

(as defined in Proposition 5).

. Therefore, 𝑌=<p= is greater than 𝑌=op= and 𝑌=qp= when 𝜋 >

𝜋R . That is, FWS is globally optimal when 𝜋 > 𝜋R . Similarly, 𝑌=qp= is greater than 𝑌=<p= and 𝑌=op= when
𝜋V < 𝜋 < 𝜋R . That is, HWS is globally optimal when 𝜋V < 𝜋 < 𝜋R . ■
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